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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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


yes
Cyprus: Governor Foot has broadcast a plea for an objective study of the British plan for Cyprus, and intends to hold early elections. Ankara has publicly announced its willingness to join in tripartite discussions. Athens reaffirms that it will consider only bilateral talks with the UK in which the issue of self-determination would be postponed.

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III. THE WEST

no
France: De Gaulle intends to ask soon for IRBM's from the United States and will insist on "exactly the same basis" as the United Kingdom. He may also seek some new NATO command arrangements in the Mediterranean area to give France a larger role. The IRBM issue may be used as a bargaining point on the NATO command question and for obtaining technical information on nuclear weapons.

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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Cyprus

Archbishop Makarios has added his rejection of the British plan for Cyprus as it now stands to the earlier negative reactions of Athens and Ankara, but Governor Foot, broadcasting a plea for objective study of the London proposals, has announced that he will meanwhile proceed with implementation and hold early elections. Athens, Ankara, and the archbishop have all expressed readiness for further negotiations, but on terms so different that they offer little likelihood of reaching an agreed solution.

Makarios' rejection of the plan on 20 June was accompanied by relatively conciliatory statements indicating his willingness to engage in further negotiations with the British and to accept a transitional period of self-government for Cyprus. His statement was in line with reports from Nicosia indicating that Greek Cypriot leaders, while ardently hoping for no renewal of violence, are firmly opposed to provisions of the British plan calling for representatives of Turkey and Greece to assist the governor in the administration of Cyprus.

Greek Cypriots are also opposed, as is the Greek Government, to Turkish proposals for a tripartite conference of Britain, Greece, and Turkey to resolve the Cyprus issue. The relatively mild rejection of the plan gives hope that EOKA will not immediately launch its long-threatened campaign of violence.

A revival of communal disorders on Cyprus was prevented on 20 June when the British immediately imposed a curfew on the south coast port of Limassol following the shooting of a Turkish Cypriot and the stoning of several Greek Cypriots. Meanwhile, attacks on Greek Cypriots by masked men have renewed fears that a previous campaign by EOKA against left-wing members of the Greek community may be renewed.

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III. THE WEST

De Gaulle to Press for IRBM Weapons on Same Basis as United Kingdom

De Gaulle is "prepared to discuss" the IRBM issue with General Norstad and will take the position that France should obtain IRBM weapons "on exactly the same basis" as the United Kingdom, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Hints have been received that De Gaulle may also ask for some new NATO command arrangements in the Mediterranean area, either giving the French a more important role in the over-all command or enhancing the subcommand at Algiers, which is responsible for sea communications between North Africa and French coastal defense.

The Anglo-American IRBM agreement of February--the only IRBM agreement concluded so far--permits British control and manning of missile sites with operational use of the missiles subject to a joint decision. Britain provides the missile sites and personnel; the US, the missiles themselves and training. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] SACEUR advises on behalf of NATO regarding deployment of missile bases.

The French have seemed to view the question of IRBM deployment as of more interest to the US than to France or to NATO as a whole. They apparently feel that they can use the IRBM issue for bargaining purposes in seeking concessions from the US in other fields, particularly as regards a larger French role in NATO and American assistance to the French nuclear weapons program. [REDACTED]

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